Amnesty for State Tax Evaders: Lessons From the California Experience by Crane, Steven E & Nourzad, Farrokh
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications Economics, Department of
1-1-1988
Amnesty for State Tax Evaders: Lessons From the
California Experience
Steven E. Crane
Marquette University, steven.crane@marquette.edu
Farrokh Nourzad
Marquette University, farrokh.nourzad@marquette.edu
Published version. Published as part of the proceedings of the conference, Eighty-first Annual
Conference on Taxation, 1988: 133-139. Publisher Link. © 1988 National Tax Association.
WHAT DID WE LEARN FROM STATE TAX AMNESTIES? 133 
Leonard, Hennan B. and Richard J. Zeckhauser, "To Forgive But not to Forget: Amnesty and Tax 
Policy." Paper presented at the NBER Conference on "Tax Policy and the Economy," Washington, 
D.C., November 17, 1986. 
Lennan, Allen H. "Tax Amnesty: The Federal Perspective," National Tax Journal, 39, No.3, 1986, 
325. 
Mikesell, John L. "Amnesties for State Tax Evaders: The Nature of and Response to Recent Programs," 
National Tax Journal, December, vol. 39, 1986, 507. 
---. "Tax Amnesties as a Tool for Revenue Administration," State Government, 57, No.4, 1984, 
115. 
Parle, William M. and Mike W. Hirlinger, "Evaluating the Use of Tax Amnesty by State Governments," 
Public Administration Review, 46, May/June 1986, US Department of the Treasury, Internal Rev-
enue Service, Income Tax Compliance Research, Estimates for 1973-1981, 1983. 
Yitzhaki, Shlomo, "A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 3, 1974, 201-202. 
AMNESTY FOR STATE TAX EVADERS: LESSONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA 
EXPERIENCE* 
STEVEN E. CRANE 
AND 
FARROKH NOURZAD 
Associate Professors of Economics 
Marquette University 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the favorable response to the Massachusetts Tax Amnesty Program, a significant number 
of states have offered their own versions of amnesty. Each state has usually produced one or more reports 
reviewing its program and summarizing the results. More recently, several surveys [7,8] have compared 
the various characteristics of the different amnesty programs. 
From these and other analyses of amnesty some general conclusions have emerged. One is that the 
primary motivations for offering amnesty appears to have been 1) to raise revenue in the short run both 
by collecting taxes that otherwise would not have been paid and by accelerating the collection of re-
ceivables, 2) to raise revenue in the long run by getting new taxpayers onto the tax rolls and keeping 
them there, 3) to serve as a politically acceptable way of moving toward stronger enforcement, and 4) 
to obtain infonnation that could be used to improve overall tax compliance. While debate continues over 
the probable success of amnesty programs in generating revenues, there seems to be general agreement 
that the latter two objectives should be attainable. 
A review of amnesty program summaries suggests that, at least on paper, the stronger enforcement 
objectives have already been met. Many states have increased penalties, added resources to the com-
pliance function, and/or introduced new reporting requirements. However, time must pass and follow-
up studies must be conducted before the full effects of these refonns are known. 
Progress toward obtaining infonnation to improve the compliance effort has been slower. One 
reason is that detailed data on amnesty participants have not been generally available. Confidentiality 
and legal restrictions are partly responsible. However, it also appears that tax administrators in some 
states have been unable or unwilling to provide data to outside analysts. In fact, some states have de-
stroyed all detailed records pertaining to their amnesty filers. Fortunately, this is beginning to change, 
as several states have generated carefully designed samples from the data in their amnesty files, and are 
making them available for further research. 
In this paper, we provide infonnation pertment to the complIance ettort by conducting a descriptive 
analysis of a sample of participants in the California Tax Amnesty Program. In contrast to other studies, 
we concentrate on those filing amended tax returns under amnesty rather than the participants who had 
*We wish to thank Mr. James Morandi, Mr. Luis Reves, and Mr. James Shepherd of the California 
Tax Franchise Board for helping us gain access to the data used in this study. They are not responsible 
for any errors. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Tax Franchise Board. 
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not previously filed. We uncover several patterns in the data which we believe may be of use in im-
proving compliance. In the process, we offer some suggestions for effective administration of an amnesty 
program which may be of interest to those who may be considering the introduction of amnesty. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since California usually has been included in the various comparative survey articles on state tax 
amnesty programs, there is no need to repeat those comparisons. Rather, a brief review of some of the 
primary characteri.tic. of the programs should be sufficient. 
The California Tax Amnesty Program ran over the ninety days from December 10, 1984 to March 
15, 1985. It was narrower in scope than many programs since it applied only to the personal income 
and the sales and use taxes. Yet within this scope it was very broadly structured. Those eligible for 
amnesty included individuals who, for 1983 or an earlier tax year, had failed to file returns, had filed 
inaccurate returns, or were delinquent in paying their tax liabilities. Thus, California allowed taxpayers 
on its current accounts receivable to participate. In fact, special notices were sent to these individuals 
encouraging them to file under amnesty. On the other hand, amnesty was not available to those already 
subject to criminal investigation. 
Under the amnesty provisions qualified participants were forgiven unpaid penalties and criminal 
prosecution. However, accrued taxes and interest charges were not dismissed. These terms were suffi-
ciently attractive that over 145,000 amnesty returns were filed by 85,701 separate taxpayers. In total, 
the program generated $154 million in gross revenue. This is well above the experience of most other 
states. Of course, much of this can be attributed to the size of California's population and the fact that 
accounts receivable collections were included. Nevertheless, according to California Tax Franchise Board 
(CTFB), amnesty produced $34.5 million more revenue than would have been collected through tra-
ditional enforcement programs. l 
Revenue generation was only one objective of the amnesty program, however. The program "was 
also expected to provide valuable information on characteristics of tax evaders and the methods used to 
evade taxes." ([2], p. 5). Toward this end, the CTFB selected a stratified random sample of 1,204 
amnesty returns covering the tax years 1981-1983. Of these. 1,018 were by individuals who had not 
filed an income tax return in the year for which they claimed amnesty, and 186 were by those who 
amended their original returns under the program. The data set also included relevant information taken 
from the original returns of those taxpayers who filed an amended return. 
In creating this sample, the CTFB excluded returns filed by individuals who were either already 
known to the CTFB or would have been detected through normal enforcement procedures. To ascertain 
the characteristics of these individuals, the CTFB commissioned Sheffrin [9] to conduct a descriptive 
study of these data. In doing so, Sheffrin developed profiles of three separate groups of individuals: the 
nonfilers for whom the CTFB had no records; the nonfilers for whom there were records in some year 
other than the year for which they claimed amnesty; and those individuals who amended their state tax 
returns under the program. 
Because amnesty participants were primarily nonfilers, Sheffrin devoted most of his attention to 
these individuals. One of his most interesting findings was that there appeared to be a noticeable dif-
ference between the two types of nonfilers. The first group, those for whom no records existed, possessed 
charcteristics generally representative of the California taxpaying population. In contrast, the profile of 
the second group was more consistent with the Internal Revenue Service's view that nonfilers are typ-
ically low income individuals with limited education. Sheffrin also noted that the third group of tax-
payers, those filing an amended return, tended to have higher levels of income relative to the State's 
population. 
Upon completion of Sheffrin's study, the CTFB furnished us with the same data set. To date, we 
have focused our attention primarily on the data for amended return filers. This may seem unusual given 
that this group represents only 4 percent of the amnesty returns and only 15 percent of the net revenue 
generated. We believe there are several reasons for focusing on the amended returns, however. First, 
part of the compliance effort involves selecting returns for audits, which by definition means choosing 
among returns that have been filed. Thus, any information that can be obtained about individuals whO 
file inaccurate returns may be of use in devising auditing selection rules. Second, these amended return 
filers can be used as a new source of data for conducting econometric analysis which can wmplernent 
existing theoretical work on income tax evasion. In what follows, we present what we believe are in-
teresting descriptive statistics which profile the nonfilers and briefly summarize the findings of our pre-
vious econometric work using these data. 
III. ANALYSIS OF AMENDED RETURNS 
Prior to conducting any analysis, we carefully reviewed the data on the original and amended returnS 
for the 186 amended return filers in the CTFB sample. Our objectives were to check the internal con-
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sistency of the data and to establish that these individuals could reasonably be viewed as evaders. The 
primary step in this review was recalculating the tax bill on both the original and amended returns of 
each individual in the sample. In the process, we detected a number of problems. These included missing 
data, obvious taxpayer or data entry errors, and data inconsistencies which prevented duplication of the 
tax calculations. We also encountered a few cases where there was no change or a drop in total tax 
liability, which suggested that the individuals in question may not have been evaders. 
Observations with one or more of these problems were removed from our sample, so that our sample 
was limited to 123 amended return filers. We see no reason to suspect these omissions bias the sample. 
In fact, if anything, removing these "problem observations" should improve the accuracy of the profiles 
and improve the efficiency of any subsequent econometric estimators. 
A. Descriptive Profile 
We use two approaches to profile the amended return filers. First we compare average figures from 
the original returns of the amnesty participants with the corresponding figures for California taxpayers 
as a whole. The objective is to check for unusual values that might serve as identifying characteristics. 
Next, we compare the amended returns with the original returns. This is done to determine the relative 
magnitude of noncompliance, and to get some indication of the form it took. We also compare the 
average figures on the amended returns with the corresponding averages for California as a whole. All 
of the relevant figures are provided in Table 1. 
We begin with the comparisons of the average figures on the original returns of the amnesty filers 
to those of the returns of all California taxpayers. We use 1983 data for all taxpayers as our benchmark.' 
The first thing that is apparent is that amended filers do have much higher average incomes. 3 In fact, 
they originally reported almost twice the Total and Adjusted Gross Income, and even more Taxable 
Income than the taxpaying population as a whole. Part of this may be due to the greater percentage of 
joint returns in the amnesty sample. But this higher income pattern holds even when filing status is taken 
into account. 
The higher income on the amnesty returns came from various sources, most of which exceeded 
TABLE I 
AVERAGE TAX RETURN FIGURES: AMNESTY RETURNS vs ALL CALIFORNIA 
All 1983 Amended Return Amnesty Filers 
California Original Amended Amount of 
Returns Return Return Misstatement 
A. Summary Tax Calculations 
Total Income 22788 45434 48705 3271 
Adjustments 481 1192 454 738 
AGI' 22306 44242 48251 4010 
Deductions 5313 4005 3749 256 
Taxable Income 17246 40237 44503 4266 
Net Tax 864 2278 2693 415 
Tax Liability' 769 2590 2933 343 
B. Selected Sources of Income 
Wages 17972 30690 nla nla 
Interest 1776 4246 nla nla 
Dividend 588 1010 nla nla 
Net Business 836 420 nla nla 
Net Capital Gains 950 7526 nla nla 
Net Pensions 815 2247 nla nla 
Net Rents -204 -1221 nla nla 
Net Other Income 237 48 n!a n/a 
C. Selected Other Characteristics 
% Itemized Oed. 39 54 39 nla 
% Standard Oed. 61 46 61 nla 
% Single Filers 43 28 43 nla 
% Joint Filers 45 66 45 nla 
% Schedule C 14 14 14 nla 
'Includes negative incomes, causing a discrepancy with Taxable Income 
'Net of Additional Taxes and Credits 
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the California averages. This was particularly true of the interest, capital gain, and pension income 
categories. On the other hand, amnesty filers originally reported less net business income and "other" 
income, and greater rental losses. 
Several other interesting observations can be made as well. For example, the amnesty filers tended 
to claim considerably more adjustments in moving from Total Income to AGI. On the other hand, their 
average deductions are well below the state averages. This occurs despite the fact that a much greater 
percentage of the amended filers claimed itemized deductions. Somewhat surprisingly, the percentage 
of Schedule C filers (i.e., those with business income) in the amnesty sample is in line with that pop-
ulation as a v,'hole. 
Next we compared the original amnesty returns with the amended returns. Assuming the amended 
returns represent the "truth," the difference between values reported on these two returns indicates the 
extent of evasion. Since evasion can take place in a number of ways, we make several comparisons. 
Perhaps most interesting is the comparison of the tax liabilities. This is not only the broadest mea-
sure in that it reflects all types of evasion, but it is also indicative of the direct revenue loss due to 
noncompliance. In our sample, the average tax liability was understated by $343. This is about 12 percent 
of the true tax bill and over 40 percent of the average overall state tax liability. 
The sources of tax underpayment can be identified by calculating several income-based evasion 
measures. We do this by comparing the Total, Adjusted Gross, and Taxable Income figures on the 
original and amended returns. From the figures in Table 1 it is clear that the majority of the underpayment 
is due to the fact that true total income was understated by an average of $3,271 or 10 percent. This 
represents pure underreporting of income. Comparing the AGI and Taxable Income figures means adding 
in overstatement of adjustments and deductions, respectively. Clearly, after pure income underreporting, 
the next most important form of noncompliance was the overstatement of adjustments by an average of 
$738. The much smaller average overstatement of deductions accounts for most of the remainder of the 
noncompliance. 
This pattern also emerges from a comparison of the amended returns to all California returns. Of 
course, income reported on amended returns exceeds that on original returns. Thus the amended figures 
exceed the benchmark values by an even greater amount. By the same reasoning, the deductions on the 
amended returns are even lower relative to the benchmark values than were those on the original returns. 
On the other hand, the adjustments figures are now in line with the benchmark rather than overstated, 
suggesting that high income levels and large adjustments may be good flags for audit purposes. 
Given these patterns, we explored the nature of the noncompliance behavior in a bit more detail. 
We first tallied the individuals who underreported income as opposed to overstating adjustments or 
deductions. These are shown in Part A of Table 2. This tally indicates that people tended to evade by 
using only one general approach, and that by far the most popular approach was underreporting of true 
total income. Indeed, over 50 percent of our sample used pure income underreporting as the sole type 
of noncompliance. A little more than 34 percent of the other filers made use of overstatements of ad-
justments alone. In contrast, less than 2 percent overstated only their deductions and less than 14 percent 
evaded in some combination of these approaches. 
To investigate this further, we examined the self-reported descriptions of the misstatements on the 
original return. A summary is provided in Parts Band C of Table 2. Based on these responses we found 
that, for those who gave reasons, on average, 1.1 detailed items had been misstated. In fact, over 80% 
reported only one type of detailed activity and almost 14 percent misstated only two items. Among the 
most frequently cited forms of understated income were: wages, other interest income, other income, 
and capital gains. The most popular deductions overstated were the medical and dental category. 
To see if any of this noncompliance was likely to have been detected in the absence of an amnesty 
program, we asked the CTFB to give us an idea of the likelihood of audit under normal procedures. 
The Board did this by categorizing each return in the sample as having had a high, medium, or loW 
probability of audit, based upon the information on the original return and the audit selection criteria in 
use at the time of filing. This exercise indicated that two thirds of the sample had a low probability of 
audit, 31 percent had a medium chance, and only 2 percent had a relatively high probability of being 
audited. While this may be due to the fact that audit rates in general were quite low, it does suggest 
that, in addition to the net new revenue which was produced, the amnesty program has also generated 
some new information on the activities of those evaders who file inaccurate returns. 
B. Econometric Analysis 
Elsewhere [6] we present econometric analysis using these data. Our objectives were to demonstrate 
how amnesty data could be used for empirical analysis of tax evasion, and to provide insight into the 
nature of the relationship between evasion and tax rates. Details such as the theoretical underpinnings 
of our model and the advantages and disadvantages of our evasion measures can be found in that paper. 
Here we summarize the major findings. 
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TABLE 2 
APPROACHES TO EVASION 
Item 
Income Underreporting Only 
Overstated Adjustments Only 
Overstated Deductions Only 
Misstated Income & Deductions 
Misstated Adjustments & Deductions 
All Items Misstated 
A. Broad Categories 
B. Detailed Income Categories 
Other Interest Income 
Other Income 
Wages 
Capital Gains 
Dividends 
Pensions 
Partnerships 
Rents 
Tips 
Medical/Dental 
Other 
Contributions 
Other Deductions 
Interest 
Other Credits 
C. Detailed Deduction & Credit Categories 
137 
Number Reporting 
62 
42 
2 
8 
7 
2 
29 
27 
14 
9 
6 
4 
4 
3 
I 
7 
2 
2 
2 
I 
34 
The econometric work involved mUltiple regression analysis in which four measures of evasion 
were each regressed on the level of true income and the marginal tax rate, along with controls for such 
factors as the probability of detection, occupation, and marital status. The evasion measures were cal-
culated by taking the difference between I) the tax liabilities, 2) Taxable Income, 3) Adjusted Gross 
Income, and 4) Total Income as reported on the original and amended returns. True income was taken 
to be the total income figure on the amended return, and the marginal tax rate was determined using 
the Taxable Income on that return and the appropriate tax table. Based on the comparative static results 
of standard theoretical evasion models, we expected income to have a statistically significant positive 
effect on evasion, while the sign for the tax rate, was a priori indeterminate.' 
The regression results indicated that income has the expected positive effect on evasion, a result 
consistent with previous empirical evasion studies using other sources of data. This also offers some 
support for the popular use of income as a factor in making audit selections. Perhaps of more interest 
is the fact that the marginal tax rate variable was positively and statistically significantly related to 
evasion in all four equations. 
We find the positive link between evasion and marginal tax rates quite interesting. It is consistent 
with an important previous empirical finding [4], and it is intuitively appealing. Most casual observers 
expect higher tax rates to lead to increased evasion. In addition, the positive link is consistent with the 
usual microtheoretic prediction that the substitution effect of a relative price change normally outweighs 
the income effect. Our finding does run counter to a view held within the IRS, however [5]. 
To determine the relative magnitude of the effects of income and tax rates on evasion, we converted 
the corresponding parameter estimates into elasticities using mean values. This revealed a notable dif-
ference. The various measures of evasion proved to be more responsive to changes in marginal tax 
rates than to cha..-tges in true income. In fact, the tax rate response \\'a5 consistently elastic, ranging from 
1.31 to 2.25, while the income elasticities were between 0.19 and 0.28, which is well in the inelastic 
range. 
The finding that income tax evasion is sensitive to marginal tax rate changes has implications for 
budget and compliance policy. From a budgetary perspective, this result provides some support for the 
"supply-side" argument that cutting marginal tax rates can be partially self-funding in that it will induce 
some income hidden in the "underground" economy to become part of the tax base. From a compliance 
perspective, the positive link between tax rates and evasion suggests that enforcement efforts may need 
to be adjusted as tax rates are altered by the legislatures. 
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IV. SOME LESSONS 
We conclude by suggesting some possible lessons which may be learned from our work with the 
California Tax Amnesty Data. These include insights into evasion activity, issues to consider in im-
proving compliance policy, and suggestions for administering an amnesty program. We note, however, 
that some of these observations have been made previously by Sheffrin [9]. 
First, Sheffrin's analysis of nonfilers tends to confIrm several widely held beliefs about evasion. 
For example, there is evidence that some nonfilers are low income individuals who drift in and out of 
the system. There is also evidence that th.e self-employed are likely to be involved. Yet there are also 
a few surprises. For example, wage, interest, and dividend income figured prominently on the amnesty 
returns. In addition, many nonfilers had significant incomes and had filed returns in previous years. 
This suggests that states already have some information at their disposal which could be used more 
effectively to track down this group of evaders. 
Some of these insights are confIrmed by our analysis of the amended return filers. For example, 
a signifIcant amount of evasion took place on filed tax returns, and that this was usually done by mis-
stating one item. The most common item was true income, although signifIcant overstatements of ad-
justments also occurred. As with the nonfilers, wages and interest income was frequently a part of the 
noncompliance. We also found evidence that evasion was responsive to changes in marginal tax rates. 
These fIndings lead to several suggestions for improving compliance efforts. Most obvious is that 
a careful matching of tax return figures with the information provided by banks, employers, etc., would 
be a worthwhile undertaking. Further, given the number of nonfilers who had filed in a previous year, 
a careful follow-up on individuals that apparently drop out of the system would be warranted. 
Analysis of the amended filers indicates that several return characteristics may be useful in iden-
tifying returns containing inaccurate information. In particular, returns with high total income and ad-
justments, unusually large interest, capital gains, and pension income, and/or low business or "other" 
income would seem to be good candidates for an audit. Of course, more analysis is needed to determine 
the effectiveness of these items in flagging noncompliant returns. 
From an administrative perspective, the California experience suggests that short-run net new rev-
enue can be generated from a carefully designed and well-publicized amnesty program. A strong pub-
licity effort appears to be critical for revenue generation. The experiences of other states which had more 
limited promotional expenditures were much less favorable. 
As for achieving success in obtaining useful information for compliance purposes, it is clear that 
advance planning and adequate resources are needed. There is the potential for a good deal of information 
to be obtained. But this requires thought as to what information is to be requested on amnesty returns, 
as well as to what supplemental fIgures should be collected from the original returns. It also requires 
that there be suffIcient funding and staff so that the returns can be accurately processed, and that the 
amnesty returns be isolated for subsequent analysis (if this is legally permissible). 
California appears to be one of few states which have taken this approach. Conversations with 
authorities from other states led us to believe that some could not have created a useful amnesty data 
set even if they were legally permitted to and were interested in doing so. In our opinion, it is truly 
unfortunate that some potentially useful information has been lost. 
A fInal administrative recommendation is that amnesty returns should be as detailed as possible. 
The "other" category appeared a bit too frequently in our tallies. In particular, we found other income, 
other interest income, and other credits to be important sources of noncompliance. A related matter is 
that care should be taken to be sure the forms are fIlled out completely and the data transcribed correctly 
to machine-readable form. We found that missing information, inconsistent information, and data entry 
errors greatly complicated the task of extracting useful information from the data. 
As a fInal thought, we would like to offer several suggestions for further research in this area. The 
most obvious is to replicate this type of descriptive and econometric analysis for other states in order 
to see if similar patterns are obtained. Another potentially informative activity would be to carefully 
match state amnesty returns with the associated federal returns. The IRS is convinced that there is little 
new information for them in the state amnesty programs. However, we believe this view is premature 
in that it is based on a review of only three of the earlier programs. In any case, even if the IRS view 
is substantiated, such a finding would offer the states some evidence that the matching of federal and 
state returns could be a productive approach to detecting noncompliance at the state level. 
FOOTNOTES 
'The cost of administering and publicizing the program was $5.8 million. Thus amnesty generated 
almost $6 of new revenue that would not otherwise have been collected for every dollar spent. Of course. 
this should be compared with the marginal return to increases in traditional enforcement procedures to 
determine if amnesty is a preferable approach to improved compliance. 
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'These patterns generally follow for year-by-year comparisons as welL 
3These mean figures may be biased upward somewhat for several reasons. First, there is substantial 
variation in the sample, with several large observations. Using medians produces similar results, but the 
differences are not nearly as large. Second, the benchmark averages are based on all returns filed. It 
might be preferable to use taxable returns only. Once again, this causes the difference in average income 
between the amended filers and the benchmark to be smaller, but once again this does not alter the basic 
conclusion. 
"'Theoretical models are ambiguous because a change in the tax rate produces an income and a 
substitution effect which may oppose one another. The outcome depends on the nature of risk aversion 
and the relative magnitudes of the two effects. For details see Allingham and Sandmo [1] and Yitzhaki 
[iO]. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At least one tax collected directly from businesses has been eligible in nearly every state tax amnesty 
program, and those taxes, especially sales and corporate income taxes, have accounted for a substantial 
amount of amnesty collections. Most of the discussion and research about tax amnesty, and tax evasion 
for that matter, has focused on individuals. although there are several reasons to believe that business 
participation in an amnesty might be fundamentally different than for individuals. Therefore, we report 
in this paper the results of a detailed study of business taxpayer participation in the Michigan amnesty 
*The authors appreciate the cooperation of the Bureau of Revenue of the Michigan Department of 
Treasury in providing data and financial support for part of this work. The assistance of Susan W. Martin, 
Stanley Borawski and Eric Krupka is greatly appreciated. The conclusions and opinions expressed in 
this paper are the authors' alone and do not represent opinions or conclusions of the Michigan Department 
of Treasury . 
